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Consumerism and Land Sales
Leonard Levin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent discovery of the risk of radon contamination in homes
and other structures has created the potential for increased litigation
between unsuspecting buyers and equally unsuspecting sellers and
their brokers to determine who must bear the loss required for cor-
rective measures.1 Since the problem is a relatively new one, there is
little litigation on the subject.2 The purpose of this brief study is to
examine the growth of seller and broker liability for defects in the
condition of the premises, and to suggest a probable outcome, particu-
larly with respect to cases involving the risk of radon contamination.
II. AN OVERVIEW
In recent years, there has been a development of consumerism in
connection with real estate sales. It is undoubtedly true that when
rights in real estate are involved, changes in judicial attitude occur
much more slowly than in other contexts. 3 Much of this delay stems
from concern for preserving stability and predictability in the context
of interests in land, since such interests are likely to continue in an
unchanged form over long periods of time.4 Nevertheless, the ex-
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.S., University of
Pennsylvania, 1948; J.D. (magna cum laude), University of Pennsylvania, 1950.
1. For a discussion of the source and scope of this problem in Pennsylvania, see
Radon Gas: Ramifications for Real Estate Transactions in Pennsylvania, 91 DICK. L.
REV. 1113 (1987). See also Sherman, Radon Testing, Case Law Unclear, 117 N.J. L.J.,
May 22, 1986, at 22, col. 3; Sherman, Radon and Real Estate: Potentially Costly Mix-
ture, 118 N.J. L.J., Nov. 27, 1987, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Radon and Real Estate]; Ga-
len, Lawyers Grapple with Radon Issue, NAT'L L.J., Jul. 21, 1986, at 3.
2. See Galen, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., T. S. Foulke & Co. v. Boutwell, 242 Ala. 526, 527-28, 7 So. 2d 490, 491
(1942); Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 302, 32 A.2d 227, 233-34 (1943);
Menne v. City of Fond Du Lac, 273 Wis. 341, 345, 77 N.W.2d 703, 705 (1956).
4. See generally supra note 3. It should be noted that the concern is often im-
plicit rather than explicit. Perhaps one of the best statements of judicial conservatism
in connection with real estate interests is the famous dictum of Sir William Black-
panding concept of consumer protection, fueled by the abandonment
of the ideal that the rugged individualist is the best protector of his
own interests, has begun to permeate the marketplace.
The concept of implied warranty in the sale of personal property
matured and became firmly accepted by the end of the nineteenth
century.5 Occasionally, the development of implied warranty in the
personalty context has been offered as an analogy for the develop-
ment of such a theory in the area of real estate transactions.6 How-
ever, there are important differences in the development of this area
of law in these two settings which should not be overlooked. A sig-
nificant number of commercial transactions are made by professional
sellers who are dealers in such goods. Indeed, the present Uniform
Commercial Code specifically restricts the implied warranty of
merchantability to sales by a "merchant" or dealer in goods of such
kind.7 In contrast, the typical seller of real estate (except for the
builder/developer) is usually not involved in the business of dealing
in real estate. The transfer of realty is most likely to represent, if
not a unique experience, certainly one that is unlikely to recur with
much frequency for the seller as well as the purchaser. It is common
for both the seller and the buyer to be assisted by a broker; however,
in the technical aspects of the transaction, both the seller and the
buyer are likely to be completely inexperienced in the matter of real
estate transactions.
The development of consumerism in the landlord-tenant relation-
ship has also been offered as being analogous to the growth of con-
sumerism in the context of real estate transactions. In this area,
there has been a rapid and remarkable increase in the judicial recog-
nition of an implied warranty of habitability continuing during the
term of a lease in residential housing.8 To a lesser degree, a similar
trend has emerged requiring the suitability of leased premises for
their intended purpose in a commercial context.9
stone, declared in the late 18th century: "The law of real property in this country is
now formed into a fine artificial system, full of unseen connections and nice dependen-
cies, and he that breaks one link of the chain, endangers the dissolution of the whole."
HARGROVE, TRACTS RELATING TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 489 (1787).
5. See generally 2 WILLISTON ON SALES §§ 15-16 (4th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1987).
6. See, e.g., Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 264 So.
2d 418 (Fla. 1972) (holding that the judicial trend is to apply implied warranties to real
estate transactions).
7. U.C.C. § 2-314(1). See U.C.C. § 2-104 (defining "merchant" for purposes of the
Uniform Commerical Code).
8. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The rule has
been widely adopted in other states, and is the rule in Pennsylvania. See Pugh v.
Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1
(1977) adopts the implied warranty of habitability as the preferred rule in residential
lease situations.
9. The landlord's responsibility, however, has generally been predicated on other
grounds. See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969) (liability
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Comparisons between the landlord-tenant relationship and land
sales, however, have limited utility because of the significant differ-
ences between the two transactions. In a lease situation, the landlord
has a continuing and significant economic interest in the land
throughout the term of the lease. Under such circumstances, it is not
unreasonable to regard the landlord as the party in the best position
to maintain the premises during the term of the lease. This is partic-
ularly relevant in the case of either multi-tenant structures, or resi-
dential leases in which the tenant may lack the economic resources
to maintain the premises. On the other hand, both buyers and sellers
of realty are more likely to be persons of relatively equal economic
power. Moreover, it seems clear that in connection with such a sale,
both buyer and seller contemplate a complete termination of the
seller's responsibility and the buyer's assumption of such responsibil-
ity, at least as of the time of the settlement when the price is paid
and the deed delivered.10 The principle of allocating increased re-
sponsibility to sellers of real estate transactions is thus sui generis.
The trend in the context of sales of goods and landlord-tenant rela-
tionships is not a suitable comparison. This article will first explore
the methods employed by courts, legislatures, and the parties them-
selves to expand the responsibility of the seller. It will then project
the probable outcome of the current trend toward increasing such
responsibility.
III. MARKETABILITY OF TITLE AND TITLE COVENANTS CONTAINED
IN A DEED
With respect to defects in title, mechanisms were created at a rela-
tively early date imposing liability upon the seller. Thus, prior to set-
tlement, the seller was presumed to warrant that the title to be
conveyed was "marketable.""1 Even after settlement, most communi-
ties deemed the grantor's deed, either by its express terms or
based on breach of warranty of quiet enjoyment); Millikin Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497,
124 N.W.2d 651 (1963) (liability based on inadequacy of water supply, a violation of lo-
cal health regulation). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY discusses the prob-
lem but declines to take a position: See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1
(1977); cf Cameron v. Calhoun-Smith Distrib. Co., 442 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)
(rejecting liability of landlord for faulty drainage and sewage system in commercial
lease setting, and holding that tenant cannot withhold rent even though premises
uninhabitable).
10. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (1981); see also Downing
v. Stiles, 635 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1981) (denying defendants use of the defense of commer-
cial frustration to avoid fully performing all conditions of a contract).
11. Messer-Johnson Realty Co. v. Security Say. & Loan Co., 208 Ala. 541, 542, 94
through force of statute, to contain normal warranties against defects
in the title conveyed.12
On the other hand, when it came to the condition of the buildings
or other improvements on the land, it was generally assumed that
the buyer could protect himself against costly defects by inspecting
the property before the sale. It was also assumed that the parties in-
tended to deal "at arms length." These assumptions find their best
expression in the maxim "caveat emptor," or let the buyer beware.13
It seems unlikely that any of these assumptions are persuasive to-
day. With the increased complexity involved in building construc-
tion, it seems doubtful that anyone other than an expert could by
inspection determine all of the possible defects to a piece of realty.
This is particularly true of defects such as dangerous radon contami-
nation which can only be determined by expert testing devices.
There is one other complicating factor present with regard to the
condition of the premises which is not present in connection with a
defect of title. The Doctrine of Merger provides that if defects of ti-
tle do exist, the vendor's obligation, absent some express agreement
to the contrary, terminates as soon as the deed is delivered and ac-
cepted without substitution of any warranties not contained in the
deed.14 On the other hand, if an obligation of the seller exists with
regard to defects in the condition of the premises, a good argument
can be made that the buyer's rights are not terminated by the deliv-
ery and acceptance of the deed at closing. Since a deed does not pur-
port to deal with the condition of the premises, the acceptance of the
deed should not extinguish any rights regarding pre-existing defects
of the premises.15 Thus, if a buyer discovers that a substantial defect
So. 734, 735 (1922); Lohmeyer v. Bower, 170 Kan. 442, 452, 227 P.2d 102, 110 (1951) (de-
fining marketable title).
12. See generally Levin, Warranties of Title-A Modest Proposal, 29 VILL. L. REV.
649 (1983-84).
13. See, e.g., Tison v. Eskew, 114 Ga. App. 550, 151 S.E.2d 901 (1960) (holding that
where defects in construction of a house were not concealed by the seller, the buyer
must assume all damages resulting from such defects); cf. Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa.
118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972) (recognizing the general rule, but refusing to apply it to a
builder-seller); see also inkfra note 26 and accompanying text. For a discussion tracing
the history of caveat emptor, see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim, Caveat Emptor, 40
YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
14. Fanger v. Leeder, 327 Mass. 501, 99 N.E.2d 533 (1951); Fulk v. Williams, 37
S.W.2d 511 (Mo. 1971). See generally 77 AM. JuR. 2d Vendor & Purchaser §§ 292-293
(1975 & Supp. 1987).
15. Generally, the rule of merger does not apply to agreements deemed to be col-
lateral to the sale. Undertakings regarding the condition of the premises have usually
been deemed collateral. See Levin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 47 A.2d 505 (1945) (holding
that an independent collateral agreement to the transfer of a deed of sale may be ad-
missible as long as it does not conflict with the provisions of the deed.); Allen v. Cur-
rier Lumber Co., 337 Mich. 696, 61 N.W.2d 138 (1953); Bradley v. Braker, 69 Montg. Co.
L. Rep. 38 (1952) (holding that seller's express warranty did not merge into the deed
thereby terminating seller's obligation once the premises were delivered to buyers);
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did exist prior to closing, such as termite infestation or radon con-
tamination, the buyer does not lose any of the rights he would have
had under the agreement of sale simply because he has gone through
closing and accepted the seller's deed. The buyer's right to sue would
thus continue up to the period of the applicable statute of limitation.
IV. SPECIFIC CONTRACT CLAUSES
When the seller and the buyer anticipate the risk of a particular
defect, it can be dealt with by the inclusion of a specific clause in the
sales contract. Such clauses have become standard in regions in
which termite infestation is prevalent.16 Other common clauses deal
with major structural defects or may (with or without legislative
prodding) guarantee a particular zoning classification and lawful
use.
1 7
These contractual clauses are of two types. One type requires the
seller to guarantee protection against a given hazard and as a condi-
tion precedent to settlement to obtain appropriate expert certifica-
tion that he has done so. Termite and zoning clauses are common
examples of this type. The other type of express contractual provi-
sion commonly employed provides for inspection and determination
by the buyer's own experts as to whether or not a defect of the type
stated exists. Settlement is conditioned on the absence of such de-
fects. Clauses relating to structural defects are typically of this
Dunseath v. Hallauer, 41 Wash. 2d 895, 253 P.2d 408 (1953). Additional cases dealing
with merger of the underlying agreement into the deed following settlement are col-
lected in Annotation, Deed as Superseding or Merging Provision of Antecedant Con-
tract Imposing Obligations Upon Vendor, 84 A.L.R. 1008 (1933), 38 A.L.R. 2d 1315
(1954).
16. A typical "termite clause" might read as follows:
At least - days prior to settlement, Seller shall furnish Buyer with a certifi-
cate and assignable service warranty issued by a reputable exterminating com-
pany at regular rates, certifying that there are no wood infesting insects
present and no visible unrepaired damage caused by such insects. If infesta-
tion or need of repairs is found, Seller agrees to cause the removal and/or re-
pair thereof, provided that the total cost thereof does not exceed $-. If Seller
does not timely procure the required certificate, Buyer shall have the option,
exercisable at any time prior to the settlement date, to terminate this agree-
ment and be repaid all deposit monies, including title company charges, and
there shall be no further liability or obligation by either of the parties
hereunder.
See 7 DUNLAP-HANNA PENNA FORMS § 4540.28 (1986).
17. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 611 (Purdon Supp. 1987) (requiring seller's
certification that there are no current zoning violations). For a typical form guaran-
teeing to the buyer that the contemplated use is lawful, see 7 DUNLAP-HANNA PENNA
FORMS § 4540.32 (1986).
character.'8
In several areas of the country, it has recently been discovered that
natural emissions of radioactive radon gas may create serious health
hazards in basements and other closed areas of a residence.19 In ar-
eas of the country where the public has been made aware of the
problem of radon contamination, buyers and sellers of real estate
have begun to insert "radon clauses" into their contracts. 20 The use
of radon clauses has the potential of reducing litigation in this area.
Theoretically, a similar problem could arise out of the use of asbes-
tos as a building material. Its use as a means of insulation and/or
fireproofing was common before the discovery that it presents a seri-
ous health hazard. Although there has been considerable litigation
concerning the liability of suppliers of asbestos materials and their
successors, 21 few cases have emerged involving the sale of real estate
containing an asbestos hazard. This absence of litigation was likely
due to the fact that the hazard was unknown at the time of installa-
tion and it has been readily apparent and easily removable.
When sales agreements contain clauses relating to a defect such as
radon contamination, determining the rights of the parties under
these agreements can be problematic. Since there are very few cases
construing the parties' rights under these circumstances, very little
guidance is available. From the plain meaning of such a clause, it
would seem to be clear, even in the absence of decided cases, that
should such a defect be discovered, the purchaser could assert the
breach of the promise contained in the clause as grounds for rescis-
sion of the conveyance and restoration of the status quo ante.
Whether the buyer may proceed with the transaction and hold the
seller or broker responsible for damages attributable to the defect is
also unclear since most clauses do not directly address this issue.22 If
the transaction were to be analogized to commercial transactions
under the Uniform Commercial Code, a right to damages might exist
as an alternate remedy and the buyer could possibly take advantage
of an election of remedies.23 On the other hand, if the transaction
were analogized to a situation where the buyer pursues damages for a
18. It should be noted that the inclusion of clauses conditioning the sale of the
property on the buyer's personal satisfaction and/or permitting the buyer to avoid the
contract by reason of his dissatisfaction do not render the buyer's obligation illusory.
The buyer's power to avoid the contract is deemed to be based on objective standards,
and thus the buyer's right to avoid the contract is not absolute. See, e.g., Herzog v.
Ross, 196 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. 1946); see also Annotation, Vendor's Failure to Make Im-
provements, 67 A.L.R. 809 (1930).
19. See Radon and Real Estate, supra note 1, at 24.
20. See generally supra note 1.
21. See, e.g., Hall v. Armstrong Cork Inc., 103 Wash. 2d 258, 692 P.2d 787 (1984);
Standal v. Armstrong Cork Co., 356 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
22. See generally supra note 16.
23. U.C.C. § 2-714 (1972). See also id. § 2-715.
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title defect discovered at or before settlement, the buyer might be re-
quired to elect either to rescind the contract or to accept the title
subject to the defect.24
In any event, to the extent that defects are anticipated and these
clauses employed, litigation would seem likely to be reduced notwith-
standing the foregoing ambiguities. Moreover, the use of these
clauses provides a novel illustration of contract drafters' acknowl-
edgement of the current trend toward increasing the seller's respon-
sibility for the condition of the premises. In this connection, an
interesting analogy can be drawn with respect to the development of
the warranty deed and the usual assumption that the grantor will
have responsibility thereunder for defects in the title conveyed.25 In
the eighteenth century, conveyancers who wished to avoid the "ca-
veat emptor" principle of the time began including lengthy and pro-
lix statements guaranteeing the title conveyed by the grantor.26
These provisions eventually crystallized into the modern statutory
rules whereby the grantor of a warranty deed is deemed to extend to
the grantee a set of warranties with regard to the title conveyed-
whether or not the express language of the deed mentions any partic-
ular warranties.2 7 It may be that the current use of termite or simi-
lar clauses expanding the responsibilities of the grantor may in the
future give rise to such responsibilities solely as a result of transfer-
ring a particular type of deed.
V. IMPLIED WARRANTY AS BASIS FOR LIABILITY
As discussed previously, warranties that the subject matter of an
agreement fulfills a buyer's expectations are routinely implied in
sales of personal property. Perhaps the most common implied war-
ranties are the warranty of merchantability and of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose.28
Implied warranties have also become commonplace in the area of
landlord-tenant law. For example, in leases of residential property, a
24. See generally 77 AM. JUR. 2d Vendor & Purchaser § 290 (1975 & Supp. 1987).
25. For a brief survey of the history and development of warranties in deeds, see
Levin, supra note 12, at 649.
26. See generally W. RAULE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COVENANTS
FOR TITLE (5th ed. 1887).
27. See generally 20 AM. JUR. 2d Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions § 75 (1965 &
Supp. 1987). For a typical statute, see 21 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5-6 (1925 & Supp. 1987).
28. As to the warranty of merchantability, see U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972). As to the
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, see U.C.C. § 2-315 (1972).
warranty that the premises are habitable is frequently implied.29 To
a lesser extent, in leases of commercial property, many courts imply
a warranty that the premises are fit for the intended purposes of the
lease.30
In real estate sales transactions, however, warranties relating to
the quality of the improvements have only been widely employed in
one narrow context. Several decisions have held that a developer of
residential property who constructs the dwellings and then sells
them as homes, impliedly warrants that the premises offered for sale
are habitable.31 Put another way, it might be said that the developer
impliedly warrants that, in undertaking construction, he will perform
the job in a good and workmanlike manner. Thus, defects substantial
enough to affect the utility of the premises, such as a leaky roof, a
wet basement, or a defective foundation, would be indicative of fault
on the part of the builder-seller in failing to perform in a good and
workmanlike fashion.32 Viewed in this manner, the warranty in
question should be as applicable to structures built for commercial
purposes as well as those designed for residential use.33 A few cases
focusing upon transactions involving residential homes have ex-
tended the implied warranties beyond faulty construction, and have
imposed liability on the developer for such errors as site selection
and/or the unavailability of a source of water for household use.34
A similar rationale might be employed in cases of radon
29. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Pugh
v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY Landlord & Tenant § 5.1 (1977).
30. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
31. Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co. Inc., 70 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979);
Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); see also U.L.T.A. § 2-309(b) (1975).
California applies a variation of the strict liability in tort concept in this context. See,
e.g., Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985). This
implied warranty, however, has not been universally adopted. See, e.g., Tison v. Es-
kew, 114 Ga. 550, 151 S.E.2d 901 (1960) (builder-seller not responsible for structural de-
fect absent proof of actual concealment).
32. Brownell v. Quinn, 47 Ill. App. 2d 206, 197 N.E.2d 721 (1964); Weinberg v.
Wilensk, 26 N.J. Super. 301, 97 A.2d 707 (1953); Raab v. Beatty, 96 Pa. Super. 574
(1979). (holding that a house built upon an old tree stump which eventually caused
cracks in the foundation and walls was not built in a workmanlike manner).
33. See, e.g., Salem Realty Co. v. Batson, 256 N.C. 298, 123 S.E.2d 744 (1962). Nev-
ertheless, there has been considerable resistance to the extension of the implied war-
ranty concept beyond the setting of consumer purchases of residential property. See
Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 Ill. App. 3d 260 (1981), 427 N.E.2d 1337 (rejecting any implied
warranty in purchase of housing units as rental property for investment). Contra
Tusch v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022 (Idaho 1987) (imposing liability under similar
circumstances).
34. If radon contamination is known to exist in the community, the seller may be
under a duty to treat it the same as any other defect in the premise. See generally
Elderkin, 447 Pa. at 118, 288 A.2d at 771; see also House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199
(Wash. 1969) (home built on land which would not support foundation).
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contamination. 35
There is little authority for extending the implied warranty of hab-
itability in the sale of new residential property to the sale of used
housing, except for a few decisions extending the builder-seller's re-
sponsibility to not only the original vendee, but to subsequent remote
purchasers.36 An argument can also be made for extending liability
to sellers who are not engaged in the business of selling property in
the usual sense, but instead participate in the process of rehabilitat-
ing residential premises before offering them for sale. In this case,
just as in the case of new construction, an absolute liability upon the
seller-developer may be posited, not only because he has control over
the factors which go into the warranty, such as quality of construc-
tion and site selection, but also because if the contract with the pur-
chaser is entered into before construction is commenced or fully
completed, the buyer theoretically lacks the ability to protect himself
through inspection.3 7
VI. FRAUD OR NONDISCLOSURE AS A BASIS FOR LIABILITY
Another line of authorities, employing common law concepts, has
attached liability to the seller who participates in fraud or fraud-like
conduct, in an effort to provide relief to the buyer of property con-
taining a material defect. Clearly, if the seller is aware of a material
defect, but nevertheless specifically misrepresents the status of the
premises by representing them as being without the defect, a com-
mon law case of fraud against the vendor will lie. The vendee will be
able to select from the alternative remedies of either rescinding the
contract or suing the vendor for damages for deceit.38 Similar op-
tions are available to the buyer under common law concepts when
the seller, instead of directly misrepresenting the truth, deceives the
buyer by actively concealing the defect either verbally or by conduct,
35. As a result, nondisclosure of such defects could result in liability for the seller.
See generally supra note 1.
36. See, e.g., Tusch, 740 P.2d at 1022; Keyes v. Guy Baily Homes Inc., 439 So. 2d 670
(Miss. 1983); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979). See generally
63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 222 (1984 & Supp. 1987).
37. See, e.g., Miller v. Cannon Hills Estates, 2 K.B. 113 (1931). A few jurisdictions
apparently limit the rule's application to cases in which the purchaser is unable to pro-
tect himself by inspection. Thus, they have refused to extend the liability of the seller-
builder in cases where the construction has been completed before the contract of sale
is entered into. Cf. Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961).
38. For an exhaustive collection of cases, see Annotation, Fraud Predicated Upon
Vendor's Misrepresentation of Physical Condition of Real Property, 174 A.L.R. 1010
(1948).
which has the result of discouraging the buyer from making further
investigation. The seller may also be held liable where he in some
other way makes it less likely that the buyer will discover the defect
for himself.39
Many recent cases have taken this theory even further. These de-
cisions have held that in any case in which the seller actually knows
of a significant defect, at least if it is such that he should be aware of
the fact that the buyer is unlikely to discover it for himself, the seller
owes an affirmative duty to disclose the defect.40 Under the circum-
stances, the transaction is really not at arm's length, and therefore
the parties are not treated as dealing on the basis of equality. Thus, a
failure by the seller to make a necessary disclosure confers upon the
buyer substantially the same rights as if there were actual common
law fraud. This rationale has been most commonly employed when
the premises conveyed are infested with termites. However, this ra-
tionale is equally applicable to other defects, such as radon contami-
nation, of which the seller is aware and of which he certainly knows
that the buyer is ignorant and unlikely to discover.41
It is axiomatic that such claims require an element of reliance by
the purchaser, so that one who is aware of the risk but nevertheless
deliberately accepts it cannot proceed against the seller on the basis
of fraud or misrepresentation. 42 Several cases arising under these
circumstances have established the principle that the defect must be
one which is latent and which the buyer could not have reasonably
39. Sullivan v. Ulrich, 326 Mich. 218, 40 N.W.2d 126 (1940). See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1976).
40. Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6
Wash. App. 220, 491 P.2d 1312 (1971). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 161(b) (1979) (imposing a duty of disclosure if, but only if, the ignorance or
mistake of one party known by the other is as to a matter which is "a basic assump-
tion" of the contract). In the illustrations to the section, the drafters of the Restate-
ment indicated that termite infestation or other serious defects in the premises may be
regarded as a mistake which qualifies as the type of "basic assumption" which triggers
the rule. Id. illustration 5.
Not all authorities support the position that such a duty of disclosure exists, how-
ever. Many of the older decisions deny relief in the absence of misrepresentation or
active concealment. See, e.g., Hendrick v. Lynn, 37 Del. Ch. 402, 144 A.2d 147 (1958);
Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223 (1958); Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank,
311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942) (all of which reject any duty to affirmatively dis-
close defects when the parties are deemed to be dealing "at arms length").
41. See generally Obde, 56 Wash. 2d at 449, 353 P.2d at 672 (plaintiffs recovered
damages for fraudulent concealment of termite infestation); Sorrel, 6 Wash. App. at
220, 491 P.2d at 1312 (applying same rationale as that used in Obde, to case where ven-
dor failed to disclose that the unimproved lot was filled land and hence unsuitable for
building foundations, except at large additional cost).
42. Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1986) (denying relief to purchaser who
was aware of restrictions on use of property but accepted seller's implied assurance
that the restrictions would not be enforced). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 537 (1977) (indicating requirement of reliance for action based on fraudulent
misrepresentation).
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discovered for himself.43 Nevertheless, although there is little direct
authority on the point, an argument could be made that despite a
buyer's failure to use reasonable diligence to discover a defect, if the
buyer is, in fact, unaware of the defect and the seller knows of the
buyer's ignorance, the seller or his broker should still be required to
make disclosure to the buyer.44 To allow otherwise would enable the
vendor to take advantage of the buyer's ignorance.
Occasionally, the difficult question arises as to what constitutes no-
tice of the defect by the seller. Suppose, for example, that although
there is no direct evidence of the seller's knowledge, there is evi-
dence that the seller is aware of facts sufficient to put a reasonable
man on inquiry of the defect. In one case in which this problem
arose, the court rendered its decision without directly addressing the
question. 45 The seller had previously treated the premises for ter-
mites. However, at the time of the treatment, he denied the contrac-
tor permission to take up the flooring of a basement apartment
despite having been warned by the contractor that the treatment
may not have solved the problem. 46 After determining that the prop-
erty was infested with termites, the buyer brought an action against
the seller for fraudulent nondisclosure.4 7 The court permitted the
buyer to recover, treating the case precisely the same as if there were
affirmative evidence that the seller had actually known of the ter-
mite infestation at the time of the sale.48 The foregoing rule should
be applicable regardless of whether the improvements are new or
used, and without regard to whether the structure is intended for
residential or commercial use.
In summary, it is important to realize that the rule under consider-
43. Obde, 56 Wash. 2d at 452, 353 P.2d at 674-75; Sorrel, 6 Wash. App. at 224, 491
P.2d at 1315.
44. Although no case has been found precisely on point dealing with realty con-
veyances, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A (1977) suggests that contribu-
tory negligence is not a defense to an action based on misrepresentation. The
provision has found considerable approval in the case law. See, e.g., Sedco Int'l v. Cory,
522 F. Supp. 254, 329 (S.D. Iowa 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1012 (1982); Morgan, Olm-
stead, Kennedy & Gardner, Inc. v. Schipa, 585 F. Supp. 245, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
45. Obde, 56 Wash. 2d at 449, 353 P.2d at 672. Compare Tusch v. Coffin, 740 P.2d
1022 (Idaho 1987). Roberts v. Barbagallo, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 531 A.2d 1125 (1987)
(holding that the rule which deems information acquired by the agent attributable to
the principal is applicable to impose liability onto the seller in a real estate transaction
in which the broker has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition and fraudulently
conceals such from buyers).
46. Id. at 451, 353 P.2d at 674.
47. Id. at 450, 353 P.2d at 673.
48. Id. at 454-55, 353 P.2d at 676.
ation can be triggered only by establishing: (1) affirmative knowledge
of the defect on the seller's part; (2) ignorance of the defect on the
buyer's part; and (3) knowledge or at least reason to know on the
seller's part that the buyer is ignorant of the defect.
VII. INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
A misrepresentation, by definition, is normally not treated as being
fraudulent if the person making the statement does so in good faith
and thus lacks the mental element of scienter.49 Relief may never-
theless be afforded to a party who relies upon an innocent misrepre-
sentation providing that the misrepresentation is a statement which
is material, that is, intended to induce reliance.S0 In this context, a
representation about the condition or character of the premises being
sold would qualify as a material one.51 If such a statement is made
carelessly or negligently--even though made in good faith, it may
furnish a basis for either rescission or for damages. The measure of
damages will be the difference between the amount paid for the
property and the value of the property received.52
Moreover, Prosser has suggested the possibility of liability for inno-
cent misrepresentations even in the absence of negligence.5 3 He rec-
ommends that whenever a seller makes a material false
representation which is intended to induce reliance, either rescission
or a claim for damages should be permitted. The measure of dam-
ages would be the difference between the amount paid and the value
of the property received.54 Liability would be imposed upon the
seller for any statement regarding the quality of the premises con-
veyed that turned out to be false, even if made in good faith and
without scienter or negligence. Thus, if a seller were to say that the
premises were without flaw, liability might be imposed upon him for
such a latent defect as radon contamination even if the seller neither
knew nor reasonably could have known of it. 55 Stated differently,
his affirmative representation is deemed an assumption of risk of lia-
bility as to all defects-known or unknown.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977).
50. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Thacher Co. Ltd., 716 P.2d 163 (Haw. App. 1986) (applying
the rule to negligent misdescription of property boundaries). See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
51. See supra note 50.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B (1977).
53. Id. at § 552C. See also Ott v. Midland, 600 F.2d 24, 32 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing
section 552C of the Restatement with approval).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1977).
55. Id.
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VIII. INNOCENT NONDISCLOSURES
To summarize, a trend has begun to develop in the law imposing
liability upon a seller for defects in the transferred property when-
ever: (1) there is a specific clause guaranteeing against the defect;56
(2) the property being sold is newly constructed and the seller is the
builder or developer; 57 (3) the seller, by word or conduct, commits ac-
tual fraud;58 (4) the seller has knowledge of the defect and fails to
disclose, even though he knows that the buyer is not aware of it;59 or
(5) the seller assumes responsibility by making an affirmative repre-
sentation as to the condition of the premises. 60
Beyond these factual situations, there exist other instances in
which the seller is unaware of substantial defects in the premises at
the time of the sale. It is readily apparent that many radon cases will
fall within this category. A question thus arises as to whether re-
sponsibility should be extended to the seller in this class of case. If
the seller is not only unaware of the defect, but has no reason to
know of it, no rational basis can be seen for imposing the risk upon
such seller rather than the buyer. Under the circumstances, the par-
ties are in a relatively even position. Unlike the merchant-seller of
goods, the risk of the seller of realty cannot simply be treated as a
cost of doing business, to be shared by all persons as part of the cost
of the goods sold, and thus computed into the price. Moreover, ex-
cept for the case of the builder-developer, the seller of real estate is
unlikely to be engaged in the business of buying or selling.
On the other hand, much can be said for a rule which imposes a
duty upon a seller to utilize his best efforts to discover defects. From
his closer association with the property, the seller would seem to be
in a better position to inspect than would the buyer, who has only a
limited opportunity for an inspection and determination of the risk of
these defects. Hence, a good argument can be made for extending the
seller's responsibility to disclose to the buyer not only known defects,
but also defects which the seller could discover by a reasonable inves-
tigation. At the present time, few decided cases have adopted such a
theory. As previously noted, however, at least one case has extended
the duty of disclosure to a situation in which the seller knew or
56. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
58. See supra text accompanying note 38.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
should have known of the defects.6 1
It is only a slight additional extension of the existing rules of seller
liability to impose a duty upon a seller to use reasonable care to de-
termine the existence of such defects. Moreover, "termite clauses"
and "certification of lawful use clauses" illustrate the validity of ex-
tending this type of liability by contract.62 Similarly, construing a
seller's representation of the condition of the premises as an assump-
tion of responsibility for defects, known or unknown, is a tacit recog-
nition of the appropriateness of such responsibility.63 An analogy
might even be drawn to the lessor's obligation, upon renting prem-
ises, to determine the existence of any dangerous latent defects
which the tenant is unlikely to discover for himself. Although the
traditional wisdom limited such a duty to known defects, the present
trend is to extend this rule to instances in which the lessor lacks ac-
tual knowledge of defects but had reason to know that such defects
existed.64
Moreover, there is a line of cases which imposes a duty of inquiry
on the real estate broker to satisfy himself that the property contains
no substantial defects which the broker might have discovered by us-
ing ordinary care.65 In Easton v. Strassburger,66 for example, a Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal held that a broker must disclose to a buyer
any known material defects which are not known by the buyer.6 7
The broker, who is generally the only professional involved in the
transaction, may owe a greater responsibility to the buyer than even
the seller in these jurisdictions. Nevertheless, like the lessor, the
seller appears to be in a better position to discover and to correct the
defect than the purchaser.68
As previously noted, one of the recent problems arising in the sale
of real estate involves the buildup in basements or building founda-
tions of potentially hazardous radioactive gas emitted from natural
61. Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960). See supra notes 45-
48 and accompanying text. But rf Hughes v. Stusser, 68 Wash. 2d 707, 415 P.2d 89
(1966) (decided by same court and rejecting any duty of disclosure where seller lacked
actual knowledge of termite infestation).
62. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
64. See, e.g., Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 506, 105 N.W.2d 244, 247 (1960)
(extending a landlord's duty to warn tenants of latent defects not only when he actu-
ally knows of them but also when he has sufficient information that would naturally
arouse the suspicions of a reasonable person to such defects); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 358B (1977).
65. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
66. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 109, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 395 (1984).
67. Id. See also Annotation, Real-Estate Broker's Liability to Purchaser for Mis-
representation or Nondisclosure of Physical Defects in Property Sold, 46 A.L.R. 4th
546 (1986).
68. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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sources.69 Presently, there are no reported decisions dealing with
this issue. Therefore, whether the seller or his broker owe a duty to
buyers of real estate to discover and disclose the existence of radon
contamination can only be analyzed in terms of the general principles
outlined in this Comment.
Certainly, if the seller knows of the hazard, it is clear that a duty
exists to disclose this fact to the buyer. 70 If the seller is also unaware
of the problem, a more difficult question arises. If the problem is a
novel one in the seller's community, and the seller has no knowledge
of the defect at the time of the sale and no reason to suspect any la-
tent defects, there would be little basis for imposing liability upon
the seller.71 On the other hand, if the existence of the problem is
common knowledge in the community, so that a reasonable person
would know of the problem at the time of the sale, it would be appro-
priate to impose the responsibility to investigate upon the vendor.
The vendor's favorable position to determine the existence of the
problem makes this added responsibility seem reasonable.72
IX. BROKER'S RESPONSIBILITY
Theoretically, the question of the broker's responsibility is some-
what more complex than that of the seller. There is considerable
ambiguity in the broker's status as a middleman representing for
some purposes the interest of the seller and for others, the buyer.73
Thus, when a defect in the premises makes a loss inevitable, does the
broker owe a duty to the seller or buyer or to both to help avoid or
minimize such loss?
The real estate broker may be the only experienced professional
involved in the transaction. As an experienced professional, the bro-
ker is more likely to be trained to foresee the possibility of problems.
Conceptually, however, the question is fraught with difficulty. Since
most brokers receive almost all of their compensation from the com-
mission paid by the seller, they ought to be regarded as the agent of
69. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
71. See supra text accompanying note 45.
72. See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984)
(finding duty to investigate by parties most favorably situated to do so).
73. See generally Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties: An Exami-
nation of Current Industry Standards and Practices, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 145
(1984).
the seller and thus duty-bound to the seller only.74 In the absence of
actual fraud or fraudulent concealment in which the broker is a par-
ticipant, it is difficult to find a theoretic basis for imposing responsi-
bility by the broker to the buyer. While it is true that an agent is
liable for his own torts,75 in the absence of tortious conduct, an agent
for a disclosed principal incurs no personal contractual liability such
as that arising out of warranty or similar contractual duty.76
Nevertheless, under current practice, the broker frequently pur-
ports to represent both buyer and seller, and may even exact an obli-
gation from the buyer for the payment of a service fee for
preparation of the deed and other routine matters involving the con-
veyancing and closing process.77 Were lawyers involved in such a re-
lationship, the situation would clearly be totally unacceptable under
the Code of Professional Responsibility.78 The practice is apparently
accepted among brokers.
Without regard to the wisdom of permitting this type of dual
agency, its mere existence suggests a reasonable argument for impos-
ing upon the broker the same responsibility to the buyer as is owed
by the seller. In fact, there is substantial authority for imposing re-
sponsibility upon the broker not only in cases in which he is guilty of
outright fraud, but also in situations in which the broker is deemed
to have acted in good faith but negligently.79 Thus, there have been
cases in which liability has been imposed upon a broker when he mis-
represents the character of the premises even though he acts
74. Seligson v. Young, 189 Pa. Super. 510, 151 A.2d 792 (1959). See generally H.
REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, AGENCY & PARTNERSHIP § 17 (1979).
75. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1957); see also Per-
kins v. Gross, 26 Ariz. 219, 223, 224 P. 620-21 (1924) (purchaser entitled to bring action
against broker for misrepresentation as to the construction of a house); Spargnapani v.
Wright, 110 A.2d 82, 84 (D.C. 1954) (purchaser allowed to recover where broker's unin-
formed representations proved incorrect); Schecter v. Brewer, 344 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1961) (purchaser allowed to recover where broker misrepresented condition
of the building's foundation).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958); Cox & Co. Inc. v. Giles, 267
Pa. Super. 411, 406 A.2d 1107 (1979) (agent for disclosed principal not personally liable
under contract between principal and third party).
77. See 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 172 (stating that such a dual relationship is ap-
propriate so long as there is full disclosure). For relevant cases collected, see Annota-
tion, Acceptance by Principal of Services of Broker With Knowledge that He Acted also
for the Other Party as Affecting Broker's Right to Compensation, 80 A.L.R. 1075 (1932).
78. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1981)
which specifically cautions, "A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exer-
cise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or is likely
to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would
be likely to involve him in representing differing interests .... Id. DR 5-105A.
79. For an exhaustive collection of cases involving the responsibility of the real es-
tate broker to the purchaser, see Annotation, Real Estate Broker's Liability to Pur-
chaser for Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure of Physical Defects in Property Sold, 46
A.L.R. 4TH 547 (1986).
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innocently.80
Should the broker be responsible for nondisclosure of a defect to
the buyer when the broker has made no affirmative statement with
respect to the condition of the premises and there is no proof that the
broker actually knew of the defect? In Easton v. Strassburger,81 a
California Court of Appeal broke new ground in imposing upon the
broker an affirmative duty to investigate the condition of property
listed with that broker, and to disclose any defects such an investiga-
tion does or would reveal. Thus, liability was imposed in favor of the
buyer when the broker failed to ascertain and therefore disclose to
the buyer the fact that the foundation of the residence was on filled
land rather than natural soil, creating a greater risk of shifting of the
ground and a corresponding weakening of the foundation.
Since Easton, there have been no other decisions which impose lia-
bility upon a broker for mere nondisclosure of defects of which the
broker had no knowledge. However, several decisions in various ju-
risdictions have cited Easton in dicta, and thus appear to support
Easton.8 2
Under Easton, it seems clear that the broker's responsibility is not
simply to make disclosure of known defects but also to use due care
to examine and discover foreseeable defects. In a community in
which radon contamination is known, such duty might include not
only the making of an investigation, but also either warning the
buyer of the problem or making certain that an appropriate clause be
included in the agreement protecting the buyer against the risk of
the defect.83
80. Id. See Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 647 P.2d 433 (1982); Bevins
v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982). Cf. Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857 (Del. 1975)
(liability predicated on consumer fraud statute). It should be noted, however, that not
all courts agree with this reasoning. Several decisions, representing what may be re-
garded as a more traditional point of view, have exonerated the broker absent proof
that he acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Baker v. Surman, 361 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Vendt v. Duenke, 210 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. App. Ct. 1948); Suzuki v. Gateway Realty
of America, 207 Neb. 562, 299 N.W.2d 762 (1980).
81. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984). See also Lingsch v. Savage, 213
Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963); cf. Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d
463, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1963) (purporting to require knowledge of broker to impose lia-
bility, reversing lower court's grant of summary judgment to permit trial on issue of
broker's responsibility for nondisclosure).
82. See generally Annotation, supra note 67.
83. See Anderson v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arb. Bd., 192 Cal. App.
3d 1336, 237 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1987) (Kline, P.J., dissenting); Heliotis v. Schuman, 181 Cal.
App. 3d 646, 226 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1986). For cases in other jurisdictions, see Gouveia v.
X. CONCLUSION
Presently, the seller's responsibility for defects in the premises
that are not covered by warranty clauses in the agreement, arises
when the seller: (1) is a builder or developer of new construction and
the defects materially affect either habitability or the contemplated
use of the building; (2) is aware of a serious latent defect and fails to
disclose it; or (3) whether acting fraudulently or not, affirmatively
represents the character of the premises.
Similarly, the broker has been found responsible for his own af-
firmative fraud or misrepresentation. Moreover, authority exists for
imposing upon the broker, as a professional, an affirmative duty to
ascertain whether or not there are any substantial defects in the
property and to disclose the existence of any such defects to the
buyer as well as the seller. It is not entirely clear whether the seller
has a similar affirmative duty to ascertain the existence of defects in
the premises of which he is unaware.
Beyond this, the creation of absolute insurer's liability for either
seller or broker seems to be impractical and to impede real estate
transactions unnecessarily. On the other hand, commonly accepted
notions of honesty and decency suggest that the current trend toward
extending the liability of both seller and broker beyond its tradi-
tional bounds is appropriate. Both the seller and the broker are in a
better position to discover a defect in the premises than the buyer.
Thus, even if they do not affirmatively know of the defect, it makes
sense to require them to take reasonable precautions to determine
the existence of defects which are reasonably discoverable. Even in
the absence of a specific clause in the sales contract, it would thus be
appropriate to require both seller and broker to assume responsibility
for a possible termite infestation even if they did not actually know
of it, so long as it could be established that termite infestation was a
common occurrence in the area. A similar conclusion could be
reached with respect to major plumbing, heating or roofing problems.
On the other hand, if the defect is one which would not be reason-
ably foreseeable or discoverable, or if after a reasonable investigation
the seller and broker remain ignorant of the defect, no absolute lia-
bility should be imposed. In these circumstances, there is either no
duty, or the duty has been adequately met.
As to radon contamination, no firm answer can be given. However,
it may be posited that liability of both seller and broker could well
turn on whether or not the seller or his broker should reasonably
have anticipated the problem when the agreement of sale was en-
Citicorp Person-To-Person Fin. Center Inc., 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 (1984); Secor v.
Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986).
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tered into after taking into consideration the local communal aware-
ness or lack of awareness of the problem. Such a modest recognition
of responsibility serves to redress the balance between the buyer on
the one hand and the seller and broker on the other. It also con-
forms to modern notions of honesty and decency in business dealings.

